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What is the role of the leak and the leaker in U.S. democracy? Liberty and security reside 
at opposite ends of an ever-changing scale. During peace and war, the scale tips in favor 
of liberty and security, respectively. In any event, intelligence is needed to ensure the 
safety of the state. Intelligence leaks threaten national security yet bolster transparency 
between the government and the people, a cornerstone of democracy. As such, 
intelligence leaks form a matter of First Amendment concern. This thesis will explore 
First Amendment rights as they relate to the media, whistleblowers, and leakers. The 
interaction between executive authority and congressional oversight is important in 
understanding how checks and balances work to monitor executive power and shape 
intelligence community oversight. Because the goal is to understand how the leak and the 
leaker affect the balance of security and liberty, the leaker in a time of national crisis, is 
examined. Through historical and comparative analysis, the thesis will compare and 
contrast the similarities and differences between the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks to 
Edward Snowden.  
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Security, particularly the intelligence aspect of it, and civil liberties seem to reside 
at opposite ends of a sliding scale. Intelligence demands secrecy in order to be effective, 
while democracy demands transparency and accountability in all governmental matters. 
Such situations as war or terrorism change the emphasis to executive authority, 
rebalancing the scale toward security and curtailing civil liberties. During times of peace, 
the balance slides back, at least in theory, toward increased civil liberties and new or 
restored constraints on executive authority.  
Effective intelligence is essential for the executive branch to protect national 
security, especially in the shadow of terrorist threats and war. In general, however, to be 
effective, intelligence agencies employ intrusive means and methods, which (may) 
contradict democratic values. Indeed, even those programs that do not actively infringe 
on or implicate Americans’ cherished civil liberties may, in some estimates, run counter 
to democratic transparency and accountability simply by being secret. So intelligence 
programs form a source of concern for the liberty-minded both inside and outside the 
intelligence community—and this concern occasionally prompts individuals to leak to the 
public, in one form or another, classified information. When revealed to citizens, whether 
by intelligence insiders or outsiders, intelligence agencies’ intrusive modus operandi 
becomes a source of consternation for citizens.1 
Particularly in light of the ongoing revelations of National Security Agency 
(NSA) methods and programs, much scholarly and journalistic attention has gone to the 
Fourth Amendment implications of domestic electronic surveillance. However, the First 
Amendment looms at least as large in the security-versus-liberty debate. In its essence, 
intelligence leaking is all about a citizen’s right to free speech as a function of democratic 
governance. In the United States, leaks of classified information to the public—for 
example, the so-called Pentagon Papers that documented the Johnson administration’s 
plans to obscure from the public the real state of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam—have 
                                                 
1 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 1. 
 2 
divulged unethical, if not illegal, activities by the U.S. intelligence community, provoking 
a firestorm of protest on both sides of the issue. Typically, such an intelligence leak 
provokes public debate, then perhaps congressional inquiry, and changes in oversight 
measures. Arguably, this process shows U.S. democracy at work; the system, such as it 
is, accommodates certain breaches of secrecy to allow the light of public awareness and 
accountability to shine into the otherwise hidden corners of intelligence operations.2 
More specifically, intelligence leakers have a role in checking executive authority in a 
given instance—an agency director may suddenly retire, or a particular program might be 
curtailed. But over the longer term, what effect do intelligence leaks have on the balance 
of liberty and security?  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
How do deliberate intelligence leaks affect the balance between security (the need 
for intelligence and the need to keep intelligence sources and methods secret) and liberty 
(the public’s right to know and weigh in on the policies and practices conducted in its 
name) in U.S. democracy? In May 2010, Army Private First Class Bradley Manning 
provided thousands of secret government documents to WikiLeaks—to date the largest 
leak of classified documents in U.S. history.3 His actions met with mixed reactions. In 
some circles, Manning is considered a hero for exposing secret and troubling government 
activities, increasing transparency between the executive and the nation.4 Elsewhere, 
Manning is considered a traitor for compromising intelligence sources and methods as 
well as a weakened national security with regards to a seemingly never-ending global war 
                                                 
2 Heidi Kitrosser, “Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment 
Protections for Leakers of Classified Information,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 6 (2013). 
3 Courtney Kube and Erin McClam, “Manning Set to Learn Fate for Biggest Leak in US History,” U.S. 
News, August 20, 2013, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/manning-set-learn-fate-biggest-leak-us-
history-v20107714. 
4 Jack Mirkinson, “Daniel Ellsberg Calls Edward Snowden a ‘Hero,’ Says NSA Leak Was Most 




on terrorism (GWOT).5 How should such incidents be understood in light of the 
complexities of national security, democracy, and statecraft in the United States today? 
The proposed research will analyze three significant intelligence leaks in 
American history: the Pentagon Papers case; WikiLeaks; and Edward Snowden’s 
exposure of the domestic surveillance programs of the National Security Agency (NSA) 
in 2013. It is important to note that each of these intelligence leaks happened during times 
of war—when the need for both heightened security and democratic principle are 
arguably at a peak. The research will explore the connections between these events, 
executive authority and democratic transparency as well as the rightful role, if any, of the 
leaker in U.S. democracy.  
Subsidiary questions and considerations this thesis will focus on during analysis 
include:  
 Do the leaker’s intentions matter in these calculations?  
 Do the penalties for leaking, which can range from a bureaucratic rebuke 
for a technical violation of non-disclosure clauses in a contract to 
execution for treason, fit the offense and the needs of American 
democracy? 
  Does over classification of information promote intelligence leaks?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Edward Snowden’s leaks continue to fill the pages of the reputable press inside 
and outside the Washington Beltway, as well as on both sides of the Atlantic.6 The 
Obama administration has declassified at least one set of related documents, to join the 
conversation in defense of the system of checks and balances that constrain domestic 
                                                 
5 Kevin McGinty, “Bradley Manning: Now That Guy’s a Traitor..,” The Topeka Capital-Journal, 
August 21, 2013, http://cjonline.com/blog-post/kevin-mcginty/2013-08-21/bradley-manning-now-guys-
traitor. 
6 Ellen Nakashima, “Officials Alert Foreign Services That Snowden Has Documents on Their 
Cooperation with U.S,” The Washington Post, October 24, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-alert-foreign-services-that-snowden-has-
documents-on-their-cooperation-with-us/2013/10/24/930ea85c-3b3e-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c_story.html; 
Nicholas Watt and Rowena Mason, “Angela Merkel Phone-Bugging Claims Are Result of Snowden Leaks, 
MP Claims,” The Guardian, October 24, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/angela-
merkel-bugging-snowden-leaks-mp. 
 4 
electronic surveillance.7 NSA Chief General Keith B. Alexander continues to engage in 
clumsily staged outreach to the hacker community—among other players in the cyber 
realm—while successive revelations about the extent and duration of NSA surveillance 
programs have not refined the agency’s public-relations approach. While he saved his 
agency and his key programs from being de-funded over the summer, Alexander has also 
suggested that the NSA will have that much more difficulty after the leaks and their 
fallout in continuing its record of thwarted terrorist attacks against the United States.8 
Alexander speaks for most of the intelligence community when he casts his agency’s 
mission—and even its most controversial programs—as a core matter of national 
security. 
Top-secret surveillance programs, including some that implicate American 
citizens, are a major part of how we fight this GWOT; however, the democratic 
prerequisites of transparency and accountability, as well as those civil liberties that 
undergird life, liberty, and happiness in the United States, might be why we fight. After 
all, in all of its forms and functions, Homeland Security really protects the basics of the 
American way of life. For this reason, the balance between liberty and security is a vitally 
important ongoing function in U.S. society. 
C. PROBLEMS, HYPOTHESES, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
One of the first problems in this realm of inquiry is the difference—certainly legal 
and perhaps ethical—between whistleblowers and leakers. Whistleblowers divulge 
information about illicit activity through legally prescribed channels, which protect—
with some restrictions and qualifications—the individual from reprisal since Congress 
enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA 1989). These are not blanket 
protections; the merit and intent of the whistleblower’s action must be non-malicious. It 
                                                 
7 Ellen Nakashima, Julie Tate, and Carol Leonnig, “Declassified Court Documents Highlight NSA 
Violations in Data Collection for Surveillance,” The Washington Post, September 11, 2013, sec. World, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/declassified-court-documents-highlight-nsa-
violations/2013/09/10/60b5822c-1a4b-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html. 
8 David Harris-Gershon, “NSA Director Admits He Lied about Surveillance Thwarting 54 Terror 
Plots,” The Daily Kos, October 15, 2013, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/10/15/1247400/-NSA-
Director-Admits-He-Lied-About-Surveillance-Thwarting-54-Terror-Plots. 
 5 
is important to note the WPA does not extend to individuals who disclose national 
security information. Examples of whistleblowers include Mr. Robert Ferro, scientist, 
who disclosed information concerning his employer, defense contractor TRW (later 
acquired by Northrop Grumman) selling faulty electronic components on military and 
intelligence satellites. “Mr. Ferro discovered in 1995 that certain transistors made by 
TRW were likely to fail. But TRW did not tell the government about the problems, [and] 
they blocked Mr. Ferro’s effort to include the information in a report to the Air Force 
after a satellite experienced critical failures in 2001.”9 
Leakers are individuals with privileged access to classified information 
concerning national security who violate disclosure agreements and divulge this 
classified information into the public domain. For example, William Mark Felt, Sr., 
former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Deputy Director, secretly leaked 
information concerning the Watergate scandal to then Washington Post journalists Bob 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein.10 Better known by his code name in the reporters’ notes, 
Deep Throat, Felt denied his role in the Watergate scandal for the better part of three 
decades and, thus far, has eluded any punishment for his divulgences. From the executive 
branch’s perspective, leakers are criminals and probably traitors, because they violate 
disclosure agreements and compromise intelligence sources and methods, weakening 
national security. The punishments can range from simple loss of security clearance to 
execution.  
Issues arising from intentionally leaking intelligence evolve in several forms: 
national embarrassment; damage to national security; constrained executive authority; 
waning public support; increased transparency; changes to oversight; and handling of the 
leaker. From a national security perspective, intelligence leaks divulge methods, means, 
                                                 
9 Christopher Drew, “Military Contractor Agrees to Pay $325 Million to Settle Whistle-Blower 
Lawsuit,” The New York Times, April 3, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/business/03whistle.html. 
10 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Records: The Vault, Mark Felt,” accessed December 11, 
2013, http://vault.fbi.gov/mark-felt; David Von Drehle, “FBI’s No. 2 Was Deep Throat: Mark Felt Ends 




and sources to the enemy. The state loses the benefits of secrecy, giving the adversary a 
tactical advantage against the state’s ability to collect and subdue threats. The state and 
intelligence community credibility is destroyed from the perceived inability to protect 
sources. The impact reverberates to recruitment efforts as potential human sources fear 
for their own family’s lives.  
The executive branch is tasked with protecting the state. Intelligence collection is 
one of the main weapons in the executive’s arsenal in carrying out this basic function of 
the office. Although democratically elected, the president has certain authority to 
implement strategies and programs to protect the citizenry, including robust intelligence 
collection. Because the U.S. Constitution is set up with checks and balances, increases in 
executive authority reduce certain civil liberties as it pertains to the collection of 
intelligence. When the secrets used to protect the state are leaked, congressional inquiries 
occur that afflict the executive with reduced power.  
During times of national crisis, when public support should be high, intelligence 
leaks—especially those substantiating violations of constitutional rights—will reduce 
support for activities that increase security and limit civil liberties. Transparency 
increases between the executive branch and the nation, as a result of intelligence leaks. 
Public debates occur, giving the citizenry opportunity to leverage congress in resetting 
the balance of liberty and security to comport with public will. The democratic process is 
flexed, causing the executive to justify intelligence programs—or they are held 
accountable for violations of the Constitution. Either the executive authority is restrained 
through increased oversight, or strengthened through legislation agreeable to all branches 
of government.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is extensive literature concerning the importance of intelligence and the 
challenges it poses to democracy. The tradeoff between secrecy and transparency is 
central to the challenge intelligence poses to democracy—individual rights and national 
security is at the heart of the matter. The challenges to democracy increase during times 
of war when the executive’s requirement to restrain or suspend individual rights is at its 
 7 
peak. Many scholars assert that the secretive nature of intelligence counters the 
democratic principles of transparency. The need of transparency is essential for effective 
democracy; the secretive nature of intelligence works counter to democratic 
transparency.11 The lack of transparency may result in a democratic government 
transgressing against its citizens’ values without any accountability. On the other hand, 
democracies cannot afford to focus solely on maximizing accountability because national 
security is equally important.12 This conundrum is not exclusive to the United States; 
democracies throughout the world, old and new, have experienced their own versions of 
it.13 For this reason, the debate is ongoing—and vitally important. “Can we in short have 
the benefits of the grin (Cheshire Cat) whilst allowing the body, and especially the claws, 
to remain hidden?” 14 
The use of intelligence in the United States dates back to the Revolutionary War, 
when then-General George Washington created espionage networks to defeat the British. 
Ever since, intelligence, in its varied forms, has developed into a key tool in defending 
the state through gaining advantage over adversaries, and is equally critical in helping 
                                                 
11 Kate Martin, “Domestic Intelligence and Civil Liberties,” in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, ed. 
Christopher Andrew, Richard Aldrich, and Westley Wark (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009); Derek 
Bambauer, “Chutzpah,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 6 (2013). 
12 Mike Rettig, “Democracy and Intelligence: An Uneasy Working Partnership,” Fair Observer, 
March 12, 2013, http://www.fairobserver.com/article/democracy-intelligence-uneasy-working-
partnership?page=11. 
13 Timothy G. Borden, “Intelligence and Democracy: Issues and Conflicts,” Espionage Encyclopedia, 
accessed October 24, 2013, http://www.faqs.org/espionage/In-Int/Intelligence-and-Democracy-Issues-and-
Conflicts.html#b; David Lundberg, “Democratic Accountability of the United States Intelligence 
Community,” in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, ed. Daniel Baldino (Annandale, NSW: 
Federation Press, 2010); Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic 
State (London, ENG: Frank Cass, 1994); Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Matei, “Intelligence in the 
Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
National Security Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New 
Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (2011): 656–91, 
doi:10.1080/08850607.2011.598784; Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform 
in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization 18, no. 3 (2011): 602–
30, doi:10.1080/13510347.2011.586257.  
14 Rhetorical question in David Omand, “Can We Have the Pleasure of the Grin without Seeing the 
Cat? Must the Effectiveness of Secret Agencies Inevitably Fade on Exposure to the Light?,” Intelligence 
and National Security 23, no. 5 (2008): 593–607, doi:10.1080/02684520802449476. Sir Omand uses the 
characteristic of the Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland to illustrate the dilemma of democratic 
accountability (exposure) of the intelligence community and effective intelligence.  
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policy makers make good policy decisions. 15 Intelligence is most effective when 
methods and source are protected; “intelligence would not, and could not, function under 
conditions of openness—its function is to discover the information of others, while 
concealing their own position and that of their government.”16  
There is extensive literature supporting strong national security that limits civil 
liberties. 17 The literature argues the survivability of the state is first priority, especially in 
times of extreme crisis. Ensuring the health of the state requires the suspension of civil 
liberties; therefore, it is the political and moral duty of the executive to temporarily 
violate constitutional rights. This camp—pro national security—operates under the 
assumption that civil liberties are important in democracy, but its importance is 
misplaced. Civil liberty is not achievable if the state in which it exists is under attack and 
the violation of those liberties is the best means to secure the state. 18 
Members of the pro-liberty camp suggest the primary focus of government action 
is to ensure constitutional rights are upheld at all cost. Members of the camp include 
Hacktivist, Libertarians, and Wikileakers that lament security is a dangerous artifice and 
                                                 
15 David Kahn, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence,” in Intelligence and National Security: Key 
Questions and Debates, ed. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2009); Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Jennifer E. Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” in Intelligence and 
National Security: Key Questions and Debates, ed. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2009). 
16 Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, “Intelligence in the Information Age,” in Spinning 
Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2009). 
17 Julian Müller-Maguhn Assange, Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet (New York, 
NY: OR Books, 2012), 1–9; Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh, Administration of Torture: A Documentary 
Record from Washington to Abu Ghraib and Beyond (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007); 
Nadine Strossen, “Terrorism’s Toll on Civil Liberties,” Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 9, 
no. 3–4 (2005): 365–77, doi:10.1300/J146v09n03_07. 
18 John Ashcroft, Never Again (New York: Hachette, 2006); “Alberto Gonzales Memorandum for the 
President,” 25 January 2002, George Washington University, accessed September 3, 2013; David Omand, 
“Can We Have the Pleasure of the Grin without Seeing the Cat? Must the Effectiveness of Secret Agencies 
Inevitably Fade on Exposure to the Light?,” Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 5 (2008): 593–607, 
doi:10.1080/02684520802449476; Richard Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in Time of 
National Emergency (New York: Oxford Press, 2006), Kindle Ed.; Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for 
an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Robert Kennedy, Of Knowledge and 
Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008); and 
James M. Olsen, Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2006).  
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liberty is critical to functional democracy.19 Their motivation is fueled by past abuses of 
executive authority and the perceived exploitation of technology, specifically electronic 
media.  
As Julian Assange, who may be one of the most prominent and most extreme 
proponents of this idea notes, the rule of law is important in democratic societies. The 
executive branch is considered irresponsible to pick and choose laws that advance their 
agenda to secure the state without following the laws that protect the civil liberty.20  
Splitting the difference is a hybrid camp—liberty and security. The state does not 
have to totally sacrifice liberty for security, or vice versa; an acceptable middle ground is 
possible. Within this camp, there are individuals who recognize that the GWOT is open-
ended due to the nature of the threat and is parasitic to democratic transparency21 These 
camps are important because they are the spectrum of competing ideas affecting the 
balance of liberty and security. The White House admittance of the need for constraints 
on the way information is gathered and used indicates the balance is moving toward 
decreased security. 22 American citizens’ sentiments fall into one of these three camps; 
however, in either case, democracy will most likely keep the scale from tipping to the 
extreme ends of the spectrum.  
The question of what the national security entails and how it should proceed, is 
inextricably linked to the broader question of the appropriate role of the executive in 
American democracy. Proponents of strong executive authority rely upon the 
Constitution, specifically Article 2, granting the executive the power of commander in 
chief. Based in that power, the intelligence community is an extension—just like the 
                                                 
19 Assange, Cypherpunks, 1–9; John W Whitehead, A Government of Wolves: The Emerging American 
Police State (New York, NY: SelectBooks, 2013); Jaffer and Singh, Administration of Torture; Strossen, 
“Terrorism’s Toll on Civil Liberties.” 
20 Assange, Cypherpunks; Kitrosser, “Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State;” Kate Moss, 
Balancing Liberty and Security: Human Rights, Human Wrongs (London, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011); Daniel J Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2011). 
21 Alan M. Dershowitz, “Rethinking the Balance between Liberty and Security,” accessed October 21, 
2013, http://www.alandershowitz.com/publications/docs/libertysecurity.html. 
22 Steven Holland and Patricia Zengerie, “White House Admits Need to Crack down on NSA Spying,” 
Capitol Hill Blue, October 28, 2013, http://www.capitolhillblue.com/node/50008. 
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military—of executive authority whose methods and sources are protected by the 
President’s duty to protect the nation. 23 The executive has the sole power executed by 
intelligence agencies to grant and revoke security clearances, as well as classify 
information pertaining to national security.24  
Current legislation supports expanded executive authority.25 The Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act is an example of legislature that expands executive 
authority. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks on October 23, 2001, President Bush signed into 
law legislation expanding executive authority to assist in the GWOT. It gives the 
presidency authority to employ tools and techniques to detect and prevent terrorism, 
including robust surveillance programs. Since its inception, the USA PATRIOT Act was 
reauthorized in March 2006 by President Bush, and extended by the Obama 
administration in May 2011, with minor changes to Section 215.26 This section grants 
expanded power under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Act to gather public 
information through electronic surveillance.27 The USA PATRIOT Act, especially in 
light of Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA surveillance programs, is forcing 
                                                 
23 John Ashcroft, Never Again (New York, NY: Hachette, 2006); Alberto Gonzales, “Memorandum 
for the President, 25 January 2002,” accessed September 3, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf; Richard A Posner, Not A Suicide 
Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
24 Argument supported by Navy v Egan ruling that awarding and revoking security clearances is a 
function unique to the executive branch and is unreasonable for an outside, non-expert to review such 
judgments and Tim Doorey, “Intelligence Secrecy and Transparency: Finding the Proper Balance from the 
War of Independence to the War on Terror,” Strategic Insights VI, no. 3 (May 2007). 
25 Legislation includes but not limited to the Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF) Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and USA PATRIOT Act.  
26 Literature referencing Bush administration reauthorization of USA PATRIOT Act is found in 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Senate Passes Legislation to Renew Patriot Act,” The New York Times, March 3, 
2006, sec. Washington, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/politics/03patriot.html?_r=0; Charlie Savage, 
“Patriot Act Extension Deal Is Reached,” The New York Times, May 19, 2011, sec. U.S, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20patriot.html. 




people to start debating their rights and liberties under the Constitution and what they can 
do to preserve them. 28  
Another important aspect of executive authority is the classification of 
information. Scholars argue that a significant amount of secret information is over-
classified. The attitude of the intelligence community to label just about every aspect of 
its organization and work as secret no matter how insignificant contribute to intelligence 
leaks both intentional and unintentional. 29 
Literature criticizing executive authority suggests that presidents favor increasing 
their authority, especially during times of crisis, yet typically do not relinquish that 
authority when the crisis subsides.30 History reveals a ratcheting effect concerning 
executive power. Once out of office, subsequent presidents follow the previous patterns 
of incrementally increasing executive authority. Past abuse of domestic surveillance 
power by the executive branch, fueled the critics’ desire to check executive authority.31 
Additionally, scholars within this camp refute the notion that the president has exclusive, 
ultimate, and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination of 
national security information.32  
What about legislative oversight—specifically methods and effectiveness? 
Scholars who study oversight methods either promote institutional oversight or 
                                                 
28 Misuse of Patriot Act Powers: The Inspector General’s Findings of Improper Use of the National 
Security Letters by the FBI, 110
th
 Cong. (2007); Dan Gillmor, “Six Months after NSA Story Broke, 
Snowden Looks Even More Patriotic,” The Guardian, December 6, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/06/nsa-edward-snowden; Robert Kuttner, “Time to 
Thank Edward Snowden,” Huffington Post, November 10, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-
kuttner/time-to-thank-snowden_b_4252208.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
29 Michael S. Goodman, “British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A Snapshot of 
A Happy Marriage,” in Spinning Intelligence, ed. Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2009); Kitrosser, “Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State.” 
30 President Lincoln is an exception to the argument of ratcheting executive authority. He suspended 
habeas corpus during the Civil War but restored it after the war concluded.  
31 Jeremy Neff, “Does (FISA + NSA) -AUMF - Hamdi = Illegal Domestic Spying?,” University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 75, no. 2 (2006): 916. 
32 James P. Pfiffner, “The Contemporary Presidency Constraining Executive Power: George W. Bush 
and the Constitution,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 1 (March 2008), doi:10.1111/j.1741-
5705.2007.02632.x; David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb: A Constitutional History,” Harvard Law Review 121, no. 4 (2008). 
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investigational oversight. The Institutional oversight model views oversight as a 
cooperative relationship between the executive and legislative branch. The goal of this 
model is for both branches to strengthen and improve functions they deem important—
not policing for the sake of policing. The investigational model of oversight involves an 
adversarial relationship between the executive and legislative branch. The prime 
objective to this method is to proactively make Congress and the public aware of abuses 
within the intelligence community.33  
Proponents of the investigative model suggest institutional intelligence oversight 
methods are profunctionary in nature.34 The exposure of intelligence community failures 
and/or scandals provokes oversight mechanisms into responding. Moreover, intelligence 
scandals or “fire alarms” are more effective means of intelligence oversight and preferred 
by Congress.35 Congress has other means of intelligence oversight that include budgetary 
control, hearings, and ability to confirm or reject nomination within the intelligence 
community.36  
There is substantial literature on intelligence leakers, the media’s role in 
oversight, and First Amendment protections. Regarding intelligence leakers, two broad 
camps exist, supporters and condemners. Scholars within the supporter camp view 
leakers as beneficial to the health of democracy. Their actions uncover questionable 
executive branch activities and abuses. Through these revelations, violators are held 
accountable for their actions. Moreover, citizens can weigh in on the government 
                                                 
33 Frank John Smist, Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947–1989 
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 21–2. 
34 Loch K. Johnson, “Secret Spy Agencies and a Shock Theory of Accountability,” Occasional Paper, 
University of Georgia, School of Public and International Affairs, Athens, GA, 1–2. 
35 Johnson, “Secret Spy Agencies and a Shock Theory of Accountability;” Mathew D. McCubbins and 
Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,” American 
Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1984): 165–79, doi:10.2307/2110792. 
36 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 205–10. 
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activities, due to the newly created transparency. Because of this relationship, the leaker 
deserves First Amendment protections, such as the media enjoy.37  
Some intelligence leaks are authorized. Senior government officials “authorize” 
intentional intelligence leaks for political gain, making an argument about government 
hypocrisy. This argument is best articulated by Senator John McCain’s comment, “the 
fact that this administration would aggressively pursue leaks perpetrated by an Army 
private in the WikiLeaks matter and former CIA employees in other leaks cases, but 
apparently sanctions leaks made by senior administration officials for political purposes, 
is simply unacceptable.”38 Another important point resounding within this camp, is 
increased prosecution of leakers will discourage government employees from speaking to 
the media and coming forward with questionable government practices.39  
The condemnation camp view leakers are criminals requiring stiff punishment 
under the law. Leakers cause irreparable damage to the state.40 Prosecutions of 
intelligence leakers are rising. Prior to George W. Bush administration’s successful 
prosecution of State Department analyst Lawrence Franklin, Samuel Morison was the 
only person in U.S. history to be convicted under the Espionage Act.41 Subsequently, the 
                                                 
37 Kitrosser, “Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State;” Mirkinson, “Daniel Ellsberg Calls 
Edward Snowden A ‘Hero,’ Says NSA Leak Was Most Important in American History;” James Goodale, 
Fighting for the Press (New York: City University of New York Press, 2013); Nancy Snow, Information 
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Stories, 2003); Bart Cammaerts, “Citizenship, the Public Sphere and Media,” in Reclaiming the Media: 
Communication Rights and Democratic Media Roles, ed. Bart Cammaerts and Nico Carpentier (Bristol: 
Intellect, 2007); Bart Cammaerts, “Journalism, Media, and Democracy,” in Reclaiming the Media: 
Communication Rights and Democratic Media Roles, ed. Bart Cammaerts and Nico Carpentier (Bristol: 
Intellect, 2007); Edwina Clare Reid, “Congressional Intelligence Oversight: Evolution in Progress 1947–
2005” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). 
38 John McCain, “Floor Statement by Senator John McCain on Obama Administration’s National 
Security Leaks on June 5, 2012,” accessed October 21, 2013, 
http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/8/post-e2f02cf7-04a9-e566-6b04-e46c45a5c500. 
39 Chris Chillizza, “How President Obama Got out of Balance on Leaks,” Washington Post, May 20, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/20/how-president-obama-got-out-of-
balance-on-leaks/. 
40 Lowenthal, Intelligence; McCain, “Floor Statement by Senator John McCain on Obama 
Administration’s National Security Leaks on June 5, 2012.” 




Obama administration has brought charges against seven times as many leakers.42 So far 
three of the seven men indicted are convicted.43  
Two main categories in the argument against First Amendment protections for 
intelligence leaks exist. First, leakers are trusted executive branch employees who 
through disclosure agreements forfeit their right to First Amendment protection, while 
third-party media organizations are protected.44 Second, opponents champion the 
elimination of the double standard of First Amendment protection so that both the media 
and leaker are subject to prosecution. Protecting media outlets that publish classified 
information—while prosecuting the leaker—is arguably hypocritical. Damages to 
national security, if caused by the leaker or perpetuated by the media, deserve the same 
level of punishment. To date no journalist has been convicted of publishing U.S. 
classified information. However, this category suggests that limiting the media’s free 
speech will help to eliminate the threat of intelligence leaks to the public. Consequently, 
limiting the press opposes core principles of democracy.45  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Analysis of this thesis will begin with discussing liberty and security, and the 
major factors in the debate to include executive authority, congressional oversight, 
intelligence, and the challenges to democracy. Next, a comparative analysis of the 
Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks will discuss the similarities and difference between the 
cases focusing on the classification of information, national threat posture, methods, 
information access, and the intention of the individual. The results of this analysis will be 
analyzed against Edward Snowden’s leaks. Subsidiary questions and considerations that 
                                                 
42 Kitrosser, “Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State,” 411. 
43For a chronological history detailing indictments and convictions under the Espionage act see Cora 
Currier, “Charting Obama’s Crackdown on National Security Leaks.”  
44 Yochai Benkler, “A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate,” Harvard Civil Right-Civil Law Review 311 (2011); Jonathan Peters, 
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this thesis will focus on in the course of the analysis include: do the leaker’s intentions 
matter in these calculations? And do the penalties for leaking—which can range from a 
bureaucratic rebuke for a technical violation of non-disclosure clauses in a contract to 
execution for treason—fit the offense and the needs of American democracy? The result 
of the analysis includes recommendations to policymakers concerning possible First 
Amendment protections for intelligence leakers, or creating an effective path for 
intelligence leaks that mitigates the damage to national security.  
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT 
That the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects free speech is no 
coincidence. The founding fathers—coming out of British rule and embroiled in the 
debate about how much power the federal government should have over its people—
made a symbolic yet strong statement about the fundamentals and principles governing 
the country in promulgating the Bill of Rights in 1789. Specifically, the U.S. Constitution 
reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”46 The founders believed citizens should have the right to voice 
grievances against the government without fear of retaliation.  
Placing the protection of the freedom of speech as the First Amendment indicates 
the critical role expression, particularly political expression, plays in U.S. democracy. 
First and foremost, speech popular—or more urgently perhaps because it is unpopular—
is vital to the health of U.S. democracy. Whistleblowers, who expose improper 
government activity, claim the government is suppressing their free expression of 
information and damaging the republic because of the classification of information. 
However, the government takes a narrower view of leaks, characterizing them as theft or 
a breach of the leaker’s sworn oath and contractual agreement not to disclose classified 
information. That is, the government does not engage the First Amendment aspect of 
whistleblowing, perhaps because exceptions under the First Amendment are few and far 
between.  
A. ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 
However healthy—in principle—dissent and disclosures of government wrong-
doing might be, the political leaders of the United States, like anywhere else, dislike 
speech that is unpatriotic or accusatory of government activities. Thus, there is a fine 
                                                 
46 U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. 
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line—sometimes vanishingly fine—between protected, if unpopular, political discourse, 
and criminal or criminalizable utterances. This phenomenon is intensified when the 
security of the state is or is perceived as being under threat. During such times of national 
conflict the government, typically the executive branch pushes for legislation to protect 
the United States from acts deemed disloyal to the state to include physical acts of protest 
and other forms of dissent. These measures almost always prove, in the long run, to be 
illegal. Sometimes, however, this determination is years in the making. 
Formed in the shadow of national crisis, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were 
the first legislation created to eliminate anti-government behavior. The Alien and 
Sedition Acts were passed into law in 1798, during the Adams administration, as a partial 
response to political infighting between the Federalist and Republican political parties 
and mostly in preparation of a possible war with France. The Federalists controlled 
government and looked on any activity against the government as a serious threat to the 
security of the newly formed republic. More concretely, in these most expansionary years 
of Napoleon’s reign, the young government in Washington also had reason to fear 
France.47 From the Federalist perspective, former French citizens and those favorable to 
France—the French had been close allies during the Revolutionary War—posed a threat 
to national security. Surely conflict with France would cause aliens to support their native 
country and oppose American sovereignty. 48    
The Alien and Sedition Acts were really four pieces of legislation designed to 
protect the state against domestic insurrection—the Naturalization Act, Alien Act, Alien 
Enemy Act, and Sedition Act. The Naturalization Act lengthened citizenship 
requirements from five to 14 years. The Alien Act gave the president the authority to 




                                                 
47 David Jenkins, “The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First 
Amendment Jurisprudence,” The American Journal of Legal History 45, no. 2 (2001): 155–6, 
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imprison enemy aliens during declared war. And the Sedition Act—which is pertinent to 
the First Amendment discussion—made it a crime to conspire against the government, to 
include individual and media speech.49   
The Sedition Act, in its letter and its spirit, ran directly counter to the First 
Amendment. Most controversial to the First Amendment was Section II, making 
seditious libel illegal:  
And be it further enacted, that if any person shall write, print, utter or 
publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or 
published, or shall knowingly and wittingly assist or aid in writing, 
printing, uttering, or publishing, any false, scandalous and malicious 
writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or either 
House of Congress of the United States, or the President of the United 
States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either House of the 
said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them or either-of them, 
into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either of them, the 
hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within 
the United States; or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, . . . shall 
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars and by 
imprisonment not exceeding two years.50 
Then-President John Adams did not discriminate in using the Sedition Act. He 
condemned any perpetrator of perceived seditious language, including politicians and 
editors of print media. Congressman Mathew Lyon was sentenced to four months in 
prison and fined $1,000 for publishing several letters criticizing the Adams 
administration, the first of which was written before the Act had even become law. 
Thomas Cooper, a lawyer and newspaper editor who criticized President Adams in a 
broadside, was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment and a $400 fine.51 
This controversial legislation was short-lived, ending with the election of 
Republican President Thomas Jefferson. The significance of the Alien and Sedition Act is 
                                                 
49 Martin Kelly, “Alien and Sedition Acts—John Adams Presidency,” About.com American History, 
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twofold: it shows how the United States restricted civil liberties during an imminent 
threat to national security, and it marked the first significant clash between the 
government and the First Amendment. This incident marks the start of contention of the 
United States over freedom of the press.  
B. THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917 AND SEDITION ACT 1918  
More than a century later during another national crisis, World War I, the 
government would create the Espionage Act of 1917 restricting the freedom of speech. 
Essentially, the act made any activity that hampered the American war and/or promoted 
the success of the enemy illegal. The operative text read: 
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall will-fully make or 
convey false statements with intent to interfere with the operations or 
success of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and 
whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt 
to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the 
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the 
service of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years or both.52 
President Woodrow Wilson—who that same year championed American action as 
making the world safe for democracy—reached for these startlingly undemocratic means 
of achieving consensus at a tricky time in U.S. history. The White House needed the full 
support of American citizens for World War I. The war seemed distant and rather like an 
adventure to many Americans, though both extremes of the political spectrum opposed 
U.S. involvement in the conflict for various reasons. Like in 1798, the government was 
mostly concerned about domestic sedition and other acts of fifth-column agitation among 
resident aliens and those loyal to Germany. With the Italians, U.S. authorities took more 
drastic measures, including internment.53 Moreover, war mobilization required a huge 
investment from the citizenry to include bond purchases, manufacturing support, and  
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draft participation. The home front was activated, as well. In this vein, the government 
resented any activity that would hamper the mass mobilization of the country for war 
effort.  
Thus, the Espionage Act was amended in 1918 to include the Sedition Act, which 
contained language to suppress individual and media speech opposing to the U.S. War 
effort. The authority to thwart seditious acts extended to the postal system. The 
Postmaster General could authorize non-delivery of mail that violated the act. The newly 
amended act made enforcement easier to obtain.54 The act imposed hefty fines and prison 
sentences to anyone who “willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language about the government of the United States.”55 Unlike the 
Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, the Supreme Court heard several cases concerning the 
Espionage/Sedition Act of 1918.56  
In Abrams v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the new Sedition Act. 
Jacob Abram a Russian and self-professed anarchist wrote, printed, and distributed two 
sets of leaflets criticizing President Wilson and the war. One set of leaflets, written in 
English, referred to President Wilson as a coward and a hypocrite for sending troops into 
the Soviet Union with the hidden agenda of subverting the Russian Revolution. The other 
leaflet—in Yiddish—appealed to immigrant Russians to stop producing munitions for 
American servicemen, insinuating that the bullets would not only be used against the 
Germans but also against Russian revolutionists. The court held the defendants in 
violation of the Espionage Act for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging 
curtailment of production of vital war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in 
prison.57 
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The jurisprudence of this age culminated in the “clear and present danger” test, 
which arose in Schenck v. United States, a landmark case involving anti-war rhetoric and 
the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1918.58 Charles Schenck, a prominent socialist, 
attempted to distribute thousands of circulars to recently drafted men to prevent their 
participation in the war on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. Specifically, Schenck 
disputed the legality of the draft based on the involuntary servitude clause in the 
Thirteenth Amendment, essentially equating the draft to slavery. The government 
charged Schenck with violating the Espionage Act by conspiring to cause insubordination 
in the military. Schenck alleged he was protected under the First Amendment.59  
The Supreme Court upheld that Schenck’s actions violated the Espionage Act, 
which it took as legal, at least with the nation embroiled in the Great War. Justice 
Holmes’ majority opinion is significant in the sense that he made a distinction between 
free speech protection in times of peace and war: 
We admit that, in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in 
saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their 
constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against 
uttering words that may have all the effect of force.60 
Just like the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, the 1918 measures were promulgated 
during a time of national crisis. These acts targeted all forms of criticism against the 
government and war on the theory that dissent was disloyal and probably dangerous. The 
First Amendment was interpreted to support executive authority on the logic that the 
preservation of the state arguably represents a higher priority than the protection of such  
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civil liberties as free speech. Prosecutions under these laws—particularly the Espionage 
Act—highlight the convention of judicial deference to the executive branch when crisis 
looms.  
More specifically, this episode demonstrates that the executive branch will seek to 
protect itself from divisive speech and actions to preserve its policy agenda—and the 
courts remain inclined to let it, rather than impose the slow and ponderous judicial 
process on decisions taken in the heat of battle.  
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL SERVANTS 
It is apparent from the text that the First Amendment affects all U.S. citizens and 
forms of press. Absent the free speech cases heard during World War I, every type of 
speech or entity is not protected under the First Amendment. For one thing, the Bill of 
Rights applies only to governmental actions—private companies can exact different or more 
stringent restrictions on their employees, for example, without running afoul of the First 
Amendment. Some policies may implicate equal-rights protections that are found elsewhere 
in the Constitution, but no one can sue a private entity for offending First Amendment rights, 
however, restrictive the speech policy might be.  
By this same logic, the government employee occupies a special place in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. On the one hand, government workers remain citizens to 
whom basic Constitutional rights attach at all times. On the other hand, the government 
employee is the ultimate insider, entrusted with the responsibilities of office, so the 
government has more control over the speech of its employees than that of ordinary 
citizens.61 Thus employees are restricted in the speech they can use in relation to the 
performance of their job and the safety of the workplace. The question, then, is the 
distinction between free speech that may be protected in terms of employment capacity 
and the criteria for what is not protected for the individual.    
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Arguably the most notable free speech case concerning government employees is 
Garcetti v. Ceballos. In this case, plaintiff Deputy Attorney General Richard Ceballos, 
claimed he was passed over for promotion out of retaliation for criticizing the legitimacy 
of an arrest warrant. The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the First Amendment 
does not protect speech made by public employees pursuant to duties of employment. 
Employees are subject to employer disciplinary action because employees do not speak 
as citizens when it fulfills employment responsibility.62 As a result of this case, the 
criterion for what may be and is not protected free speech depends on whether the 
individual is acting in the capacity of an ordinary citizen whose speech benefits public 
welfare or as an individual acting in the performance of their employment.  
Several other court cases were key in determining the First Amendment rights of 
individuals within the workplace, as well as set the legal precedence of how to test for 
First Amendment speech protection. For example, in Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District, Bessie Givhan, a junior high school teacher complained to 
the principle in the 1970–1971 school year of discriminatory practices within the schools 
where she taught. She claimed racial discrimination existed in the appointment of the 
administrators, clerical staff, and cafeteria workers. Her allegations were communicated 
both verbally and in writing. At the end of the school year her contract was not renewed. 
The school board superintendent’s decision was heavily influenced by the principle’s 
letter stating, “Ms. Givhan is a competent teacher, however, on many occasions she has 
taken an insulting and hostile attitude towards me and other administrators. She hampers 
my job greatly by making petty and unreasonable demands. She is overly critical for a 
reasonable working relationship to exist between us.”63 Givhan sued the school district, 
claiming her dismissal was based on complaints made to the principle and the First 
Amendment protected them. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit court 
decision against her. This case is significant because the Supreme Court ruled the First 
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Amendment might protect an employee from reprisal by their employer, offering the 
employee a certain amount of protection against employer reprisal.  
Essentially, the Supreme Court decided that public employees are allowed to 
express their opinions either negative or positive without the fear of reprisal.64 This case 
is unique because it further refined the degree of one’s free speech within the work 
environment, at least in the public sector. Free speech protection is not solely dependent 
on the individual’s right to address public concern in a public forum, but to balance it 
against the interest of the employee.  
Through case law the Supreme Court has developed a three-part test to evaluate 
whether the First Amendment protects a public employee in a given utterance or 
publication. First, such conditions are reviewed as the manner, time, and place an 
employee’s comment. Second, the court must assess if the speech impedes the proper 
operation of the employee’s duties or the overall operation of the workplace. Third, when 
job loss is at stake, the court determines if the employee was terminated for exercising 
constitutional right of free speech or whether termination would occur regardless.65 The 
Pickering balance test is used to make those determinations. The test gets its name from 
Pickering v. Illinois Board of Education, which marked the first time the Supreme Court 
adjudicated a case of a public employee criticizing an employer.66 The eponymous 
balance test that came of Pickering is a two-part process that asks first, if the speech is a 
matter of public concern. Second, it weighs the employee’s interest speaking on a matter 
of public concern and that of the interest of the employer.67  
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The interest of the government is, as a matter of general principles, considered to 
be particularly high in safeguarding state secrets.68 Thus, federal employees requiring 
access to classified information are vetted through a security screening process. Once 
granted, the individual signs a non-disclosure agreement restricting their ability to 
divulge classified information. The agreement is an acknowledgement between the 
individual to the executive branch to keep information secret in agreeing to certain 
punishment if the agreement is broken. In this regard, the First Amendment does not 
automatically protect all federal employees’ free speech, if used in the function of 
employment. In fact, the federal employee is subject to government reprisal to include 
termination of security clearance or employment—harsh measures that are meant to make 
compliance more likely.  
The security clearance vetting system is designed to screen and mitigate 
compromises of classified information. The security clearance granting system is based 
on establishing an individual’s trustworthiness. Arguably, federal employees with access 
to privileged information hold a position of trust because they handle sensitive 
information involving national security. This trust is violated when a federal employee 
leaks classified information. 
D. THE MEDIA, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
Generally speaking, the media fare better than individuals as far as First 
Amendment protection is concerned. After all, the text of the amendment explicitly 
guarantees freedom of the press. Today, “the press” encompasses a wide variety of 
media, including movies, music, print, and television. The constitutional concern remains 
the same: Government censorship that stifles free expression in these crucial media, 
particularly when political expression is at issue. 
The First Amendment was—and is—necessary because the media and the 
government have a love-hate relationship, even as all sides acknowledge the centrality of 
a lively, independent media to the health of the democracy. On one hand, the relationship 
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is harmonious when both parties benefit. For example, the government uses the media to 
communicate policy and gauge the temperature of the nation’s response. Similarly, the 
media benefits when it is able obtain exclusive access to information and develop sources 
of future media releases. The relationship becomes contentious when the media releases 
controversial information implicating the government—for example, secret national 
security programs. The government may seek to silence the story or gain access to the 
information source.  
This tension becomes particularly acute when the story at issue implicates the 
national security. For example, in the Pentagon Papers case, the government attempted to 
intervene in the publication of classified information about American efforts in the 
Vietnam War. More properly, New York Times Co. v. United States, the landmark case, 
tested the limits of the government to restrict and the media to exercise free speech. The 
Supreme Court decided resolutely in favor of the newspaper’s First Amendment rights. 
Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart’s concurrent opinion communicates the rationale 
for broad media protection—the democratic role of the media to create transparency and 
place checks on executive authority: 
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other 
areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy 
and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie 
in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion 
which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For 
this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most 
vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an 
informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.69  
The media enjoys a certain amount power and prestige—as the storied “fourth 
estate” in society—because it is the primary means to inform the nation. The media 
facilitates interaction between the government and the people. Through this function, the 
public learns about government programs and policy. Most citizens rely on a free and 
open media to do the legwork and inform. The abundance of media outlets affords  
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citizens the opportunity to learn about issues that are not in the local news headlines. 
Through this means the media helps the public to form opinion, and thus participate in 
the democratic process.70  
Leakers leverage American citizens’ expectations of a free press to influence 
policy. Leakers use the media to leak classified information. This aspect of the media is 
troublesome for the government, and has been a protagonist for legal action by the 
government against media. Secrecy is an inherent part of the intelligence community and 
a function of executive authority. The ability to keep methods and sources confidential is 
critical to state security. On the other hand, classifying information to hide criminal, 
unethical, or political ambitions abuses the trust between the government and its citizens. 
The leakers are not limited to the intelligence community; policymakers intentionally 
leak information for political reasons.  
E. WHISTLE-BLOWER 
1. What is a Whistle-blower? 
Whistleblowers are important to U.S. democracy and the discussion about 
intelligence leaks. The person who divulges information is considered either a 
whistleblower or a leaker—there is not a middle ground or subcategory.  Whistleblowers 
are individuals who reveal information in either one of two forms: authorized or non-
authorize disclosures. In some circles, whistleblowers are loathed because they reveal 
information that brings scrutiny to the effected organization. In others, they are celebrated 
for shedding light on fraudulent and at times criminal behavior. In the past, employers 
have had little concern for retaliation against whistleblowers due to limited protections. 
The employer has had the prerogative to discipline the employee—in the worst case, the 
employee is blacklisted in his or her profession. In other words, the whistleblower 
assumes enormous risk, often to his or her own detriment. Because of the risks involved, 
the question looms: Why would someone knowingly subject himself or herself to 
potential reprisal in divulging classified information?  
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According to Executive Order 12731, whistleblower laws are not specifically 
designed to protect employees with valid proven allegations against their employer. It 
mandates all federal employees to disclose “waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption.”71 The 
Office of Government Ethics (OGE) set the regulations implementing the order 
encouraging robust reporting of suspected misconduct. It is not the whistleblower’s 
responsibility to determine whether an offense is worthy of reporting—just report what 
they believe as wrongdoing to the appropriate authority.72  
It is impossible for the Congress to find every instance of fraud, waste, abuse, and 
wrongdoing. It has a vested interest in encouraging whistleblowing because it aids in 
oversight and creates transparency between the people, business and government so 
Congress encourages whistleblowing to bring attention to those issues. According to 
Senator Grassley: 
Whistleblowers strengthen our system of checks and balances, and that 
strengthens our system of representative government. It’s a constant battle 
to make sure that these patriotic citizens who shed light on overspending, 
mismanagement and layers of ineffective leadership within the federal 
government are protected.73  
2. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 
The latest legislation pertaining to whistleblowing is the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012. Signed into law November 27, 2012, WPEA 
strengthens the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) to better protect federal employees 
who come forward to disclose government waste, fraud, abuse, and other wrongdoing.74 
Previous iterations of the WPA made it difficult for the Whistleblowers to acquire 
protection under the law.  
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The Merit Systems Protections Board (MSPB) was designed to assess the merits 
of the employer’s retaliation against the whistleblower. Federal employee petitions for 
whistleblower protection undergo the MSPB. It determines if the whistleblower will be 
protected from agency reprisal. The decision is final unless overturned by the appeals 
process, however the Federal Court of Appeals rarely rules in the whistleblower’s favor. 
Between October 1994 and May 2012 the Court has a 3–226 record against 
whistleblowers for decisions on the MSPB. The WPEA allows the whistleblower to 
petition the MSPB for protection before the agency presents its defense and expands 
appeals court jurisdiction. Additionally, the act protects whistleblowers from criticizing 
the results of government policy.75   
F. CONCLUSION 
Arguably the impetus for creating the First Amendment was to protect citizens 
against a tyrannical government. The founding fathers recognized the importance of the 
media to enlighten the people—and thus insured its protection with the First Amendment. 
They also understood a certain amount of tension between the government and the 
governed is unavoidable; therefore, individual speech must be protected.  
Whistleblowers benefit U.S. democracy by enlightening the public. Through the 
whistleblower’s awakening, citizens can demand change and hold their leadership 
accountable. This dividend aligns with the democratic principles the founding fathers 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. The ability to criticize government practices protects 
the citizens from tyrannical governance. Information by way of whistleblowers or leakers 
is critical to the congressional oversight process. Therefore, whistleblowers and leakers 
are an integral part of the discussion concerning government transparency and 
accountability. The sum of the relevant First Amendment cases is that the best intentions 
to protect the state can damage the principles and/or people it was created to protect. 
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III. LEAKS OF AN EXTERNAL NATURE: THE PENTAGON 
PAPERS AND WIKILEAKS  
There were two major leaks of government activities an external nature. Leaks of 
an eternal nature divulge government information towards foreign policies; for example, 
the United States foreign policy decisions concerning Vietnam. Daniel Ellsberg, who 
leaked a government study that he was involved in, conducted the first leak. Private First 
Class Bradley Manning, who had leaked over 720,000 documents over the course of 
several months, conducted the second leak. Both of these leaks were initially considered 
acts of treason, as they exposed classified policies of the United States during times of 
war. These leaks were the first significant intelligence leaks to occur within the United 
States. 
Although civil servants and others with access to sensitive information may leak 
this material at any time, the urgency of—and sensitivity to—leaking is much higher 
during times of crisis. Daniel Ellsberg and Private First Class (PFC) Bradley Manning are 
two such individuals who exploited their privileged access to classified documents and 
leaked them in the public domain during a period of national crisis: the Pentagon Papers 
and WikiLeaks, perpetrated by Ellsberg and Manning respectively. Aside from 
committing a possible treasonous act, Ellsberg’s Pentagon Papers leaks revealed the true 
nature and cause for the Vietnam War and redefined the media’s role in the United States. 
76 Manning’s disclosure, also considered treasonous in many circles, disclosed a host of 
documents affecting public opinion domestically and internationally about United States 
conduct in Afghanistan, Iraq, and within the diplomatic arena.  
A. THE PENTAGON PAPERS 
The leak by Ellsberg (hereafter referred to as the Pentagon Papers) was quickly 
named the Pentagon Papers by the press because the Pentagon originated the study 
material that was leaked. This leak became the archetype for contemporary leakers 
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because it was the first incident of this sort, and it set the precedence for leaking 
classified information. Ellsberg became the face of intelligence leaks due to the following 
four reasons: 1) the method in which he leaked the material; 2) the content of the material 
leaked; 3) the implication to the government from the material leaked; and 4) the fact that 
he was exonerated in a court of law. These four characteristics led to the de facto 
standard for the conduct of future leakers.  
1. Background 
The Pentagon Papers, officially named “History of U.S. Decision-making in 
Vietnam, 1945–1968,” was a study commissioned in 1967 by then-Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara. Concerned about U.S. military progress in Vietnam, McNamara 
assembled a team from the Pentagon, State Department, universities, and such think-
tanks as the RAND Corporation, and granted them unprecedented access to information 
ranging from his personal files, White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff documents, State 
Department records, and CIA requests—all in the name of assembling the complete 
history of the Vietnam War. Information contained in the study required high 
classification due to the breadth of knowledge gained from confidential sources and such 
questionable practices as domestic wiretapping, to say nothing of the increasing 
controversy in the United States about the war. In 1971, as more and more Americans 
identified themselves as opponents of the war, the 7,000-page, 47-volume, study was 
leaked to the New York Times, which published parts of the document on its front page. 
The revelations in it proved explosive.  
For instance, until the Pentagon Papers appeared, both Congress and the public 
believed the Gulf of Tonkin incident was the reason why the United States went to war 
with Vietnam. The conventional account is straightforward. On August 4, 1964, North 
Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy while 
conducting reconnaissance missions in the Gulf of Tonkin. A day later, Johnson gave a 
special message to Congress asking for permission to retaliate against North Vietnam. He 
leveraged President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1954 pledge of support and the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty signed in 1955. The treaty required the United States to 
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counter the threat of communist aggression against signatory states. On August 7, 
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against North Vietnam.77  
The Pentagon Papers told the rest of the story. Before the August 4, 1964, attacks, 
the United States had ordered air strikes over Laos and strafed North Vietnamese 
villages. Congress was not aware of these military operations, or any covert action 
against North Vietnam. As the report confirmed, the executive branch had deceived and 
manipulated Congress into supporting a war that had already commenced. 78 
2. Daniel Ellsberg 
Daniel Ellsberg was one of the first people recruited to work on the Pentagon 
Papers. In many ways, he was a natural choice. Born in Chicago, Illinois, on April 7, 
1931, Ellsberg was smart and patriotic. He attended Harvard University on scholarship 
and earned his PhD in economics. In between, he attended the University of Cambridge 
on the Woodrow Wilson fellowship and enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps, serving as 
platoon leader and company commander in the Marine 2
nd
 Infantry Division. Ellsberg’s 
patriotism does not end with his decision to leave Harvard and join the Marines. He chose 
to delay his return to school and extended active duty service so he could lead his 
company into battle if the United States opposed Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez 
Canal. Ellsberg could not stand the thought of watching the men he commanded be put to 
the test while he watched from Harvard. His academic and military experience gained 
him employment at the RAND Corporation as a strategic analysis. 79 
Ellsberg’s views against U.S. involvement in Indochina started to develop in 1961 
while he was working on a government task force in Vietnam. Interviews with members 
of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) cemented his position that the 
United States should not become further entangled in Vietnam affairs because the conflict 
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was not winnable. The MAAG leadership felt that Vietnam was at most two years away 
from succumbing to communism. If a coup attempt against then-President Ngo Dinh 
Diem was successful, communism would prevail in a matter of months. All the 
documents that Ellsberg read pointed to a situation in which the United States would not 
prevail. 80 
In 1964, his assignment as the special assistant to John T. McNaughton, deputy 
assistant secretary of defense for international security, offered more insight into the 
situation occurring in Vietnam. McNaughton presented Ellsberg a golden opportunity—
to observe the Vietnam conflict from the inside while it was ongoing. He was privy to an 
array of top-secret documents concerning Vietnam. He joined General Edward 
Lansdale’s liaison team in Vietnam and saw the conflict with his own eyes. He read 
copious amounts of classified documents and spent his time in Vietnam conversing with 
Vietnamese leaders as well as with U.S. military personnel.81  
McNaughton recruited Ellsberg to work on the Pentagon Papers project. Ellsberg 
focused on the 1961 Kennedy administration policy, on which he wrote 350 pages.82 He 
also read the other sections of the reports. His expertise in Vietnam, plus the knowledge 
he gained while working on the Pentagon Papers, set him on a course to change U.S. 
foreign policy—when he took the report to a New York Times reporter. 83 
Leaking to the media was not Ellsberg’s first recourse. He made several attempts 
to change the government’s policy regarding Vietnam inside government channels. First 
he helped several congressmen who opposed the war draft a resolution insisting for U.S. 
troop withdrawal from Vietnam. A month later he gave Senator William Fulbright, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a copy of the Pentagon Papers. 
Later he met with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to whom he voiced his concern 
over U.S. policy in Vietnam and encouraged him to read the Pentagon Papers. 
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Additionally, he met with Senator George McGovern where he again voiced concerns 
over the U.S. Vietnamese foreign policy. After their meeting, Senator McGovern told 
Ellsberg he would read the Pentagon Papers in a filibuster—but later reneged on the 
promise after announcing his presidential candidacy. 84 
Government inaction was Ellsberg’s tipping point. Dissatisfied with government 
inactivity, Ellsberg decided to leak the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times.85 For his 
actions, Ellsberg faced 12 federal felony charges and the possibility of 115 years in 
prison. Government criminal misconduct arising from White House attempts to covertly 
silence and/or incapacitate Ellsberg led to dismissal of all charges. 86   
B. WIKILEAKS 
The leak by PFC Bradley Manning (hereafter referred to as WikiLeaks) occurred 
nearly four decades after the Pentagon Papers. The soil for the WikiLeaks disclosure was 
cultivated by the legacy of the Nixon administration—a muscular but aloof executive that 
would stoop to dirty tricks and outright crimes to make its point with the public that it 
needed but did not much respect. WikiLeaks flooded the public arena with a host of 
secrets concerning the United States and some of its closest allies—all with the 
implication that the prevailing powers must be up to something behind all those closed 
doors, sealed safes, and classification levels.  
Manning’s leak is referred to as WikiLeaks because the documents were 
published on the WikiLeaks website, which was once an obscure internet repository of 
leaked documents and other artifacts of the millennial cyber-punk set. The obscure 
website gained global notoriety for the massive intelligence leak of U.S. documents. 
Debuting in 2007, the website’s most prominent exposure up until Manning’s leak was 
from non-U.S. related information about the governmental corruption of former Kenyan 
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President Daniel Arap Moi. In any event, Wikileaks did not reveal anything particularly 
scathing about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there were no government 
conspiracies to deceive U.S. citizens. Nonetheless, the staggering amount of official 
material suddenly stripped of its protective classifications dramatically increased the 
significance of WikiLeaks. For his role in this massive disclosure, Bradley Manning 
received a prison sentence of 35 years for violating the Espionage Act. 
1. Background 
WikiLeaks is a website championed by Julian Assange and dedicated to exposing 
corruption, broadly defined, and breaking governments’ monopolies on information that 
these same governments classify. Anonymously, individuals would use the site to upload 
sensitive documents. Assange envisioned WikiLeaks to work similar to Wikipedia—
individuals could upload information and create an open source intelligence agency. 
Documents are write-protected and untraceable. By using cutting-edge encryption 
technology, large-scale intelligence leaks are protected. The website used sophisticated 
encryption software—TOR—making it virtually impossible to trace the origin of the 
leaker. TOR is software that strips all the identifiable metadata from Internet uploads. 
The U.S. Naval Research laboratory developed TOR in 1995. Its use has proliferated to 
hackers worldwide. Essentially, the government information was both leaked and 
protected by a program it designed.  
The virtual nature of WikiLeaks shielded it from international legal consequences. 
A court ruling in one particular country to shut down a domain server (holding classified 
information) is irrelevant to WikiLeak’s operation because it would shutdown that server 
and replicate the information to a server in another country outside the jurisdiction of the 
law. 87 
2. Bradley Manning 
U.S. Army PFC Manning committed the second significant and perhaps the 
largest intelligence leak in U.S. history. The leak was unprecedented, not just by content 
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but by its size. Julian Assange, facilitator of the Manning leaks, commented that the files 
that Manning downloaded and turned over to WikiLeaks were “the largest set of 
confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain.”88 They totaled over 
720,000 files encompassing more than 251,000 internal U.S. State Department 
documents, generated by 280 embassies in 180 countries.89 Some of the documents were 
benign—for example, essays on new thinking about old problems. Others were 
provocative, like an account of a Saudi Arabian sex party.90  
Manning came to these documents through his job. He was an intelligence analyst 
assigned to the 2
nd
 Brigade Combat Team, 10
th
 Mountain Division at Camp Hammer in 
Iraq when he leaked information to WikiLeaks.91 Bradley Manning was born December 
17, 1987, in Crescent, Oklahoma.92 At a young age, he stood out as a little different. 
Manning had strong convictions, most notably his atheism, which was unusual in the 
predominantly Christian town of 1,400 people. He refused to say the Pledge of 
Allegiance at school because of its invocation of a deity in the closing line: “One nation 
under God.” On the other hand, his teachers noticed he was smart, precocious, and had a 
knack for computers.93  
By age 15, Manning started to develop a political outlook critical of U.S. foreign 
policy. During the invasion of Iraq, he spoke against President Bush, claiming that the 
reason for the war was oil, and thus the United States had no legitimate excuse for the 
action. A former employer at a photo-sharing software company noticed how Manning 
carried on about his political opinion, which the manager thought was odd for a 17-year-
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old boy. In October 2007, Manning—the lifelong contrarian—followed in his father’s 
footsteps and joined the military. 94  
Shortly after finishing his military training, Manning became romantically 
involved with Tyler Watkins.95 Watkins attended Brandeis University and introduced 
Manning to his wide array of friends, including several who were actively involved in 
hacking. Manning’s involvement with the Boston hacker movement influenced his 
outlook about information. He shared the sentiment of the majority of hackers who 
believe information—whether classified government communications or copyrighted 
artistic expression—should be free and in the public domain. Still, although he had access 
to classified information, Manning had not decided to leak classified information to 
WikiLeaks. 96 
Arguably, the incident that pushed Manning to violate his disclosure agreements 
and set about collecting—then leaking—as much information as he could is linked to a 
situation concerning 15 Iraqi detainees disseminating anti-Iraq leaflets. The group was 
held by the National Iraqi police force. Tasked with finding the offending party, Manning 
discovered the detainees were held for distributing a scholarly critique against Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, specifically on the corruption in his administration. Manning 
informed the officer in charge what had taken place. According to Manning, “he (officer 
in charge) did not want to hear any of it … . [H]e told me to shut up and explain how we 
could assist the police in finding more detainees.”97 According to Manning, the reality 
sank in that, in his current role, he was part of something to which he was morally 
opposed.98  
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C. ANALYSIS 
The Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks occurred while the United States was in an 
extended conflict. Because the nation was at war for both incidents, a greater number of 
people had access to classified material as a part of their war-related duties (uniformed 
and civilian). The fact that there was no end in sight for either conflict raised the 
likelihood that dissenters, even throughout the ranks of the military, would take sensitive 
documents to the public. 
The Pentagon Papers were significant because they revealed that the United States 
went to war in Vietnam for reasons other than those given by the executive branch. By 
the time Manning’s leak went live, the public was aware that the original reason for the 
invasion of Iraq—weapons of mass destruction—was false and the war in Afghanistan 
was partly in response to the 9/11 attacks. So the effects of each episode are different—
but related. 
The timing of each leak is worth considering. The leaks did not occur in the 
infancy stages of public knowledge of the wars. Leaks happened several years into the 
conflicts. Arguably, they represented popular public opinion about the war. There was 
not a lot of public support for the Vietnam War; the timing of Ellsberg’s disclosure was 
prime for a receptive public. Manning also leaked information when public support for 
the war had declined. This same public had learned, thanks to Ellsberg and other figures 
of the Watergate area, to be skeptical of its government and its war plans. So even if 
Manning’s disclosures did not change the course of the war or the popular perception of 
it, they did reach a ready audience—confirming the darker suspicions of some critics, and 
causing the United States to endure ongoing embarrassment in its international relations. 
1. Access to Leaked Classified Information 
While Ellsberg and Manning used their privileged access to classified information 
to steal government secrets, the United States classification system does have certain 
safeguards in place to restrict access to information. Access to information is contingent 
on a need-to-know basis for job requirements, and is not granted solely based on an 
authorized security clearance level. 
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Ellsberg limited his leak to the Pentagon Papers only because it was all he deemed 
necessary to accomplish his goal. In order to remove the classified document from it 
secure location, Ellsberg smuggled out and returned the report in a piecemeal fashion 
over an extended period, as he was limited by the technology of his time. In contrast to 
this, Manning did not limit the scope of material leaked, and he was not constrained to 
any physical format (his documents were not on paper).99 Manning could access more 
information because of technology such as the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPR-Net) and Joint World Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), which 
provided him a treasure trove of data. Moreover, Manning was able to produce digital 
copies on sight, removing the requirement to return the information—thus reducing his 
overall risk.  
Ellsberg and Manning’s access to information provided the opportunity to leak 
information, but the use of technology was problematic to the state in both cases. The 
copy machine was the government’s nemeses in Ellsberg’s era, and the Internet during 
Manning’s. Perhaps the problem has less to do with access to information, and more with 
the technology used for its transfer.  
2. Material Leaked  
The content of the material Ellsberg and Manning leaked indicates who and what 
they were trying to target. Ellsberg focused his leaks on the Vietnam War. Manning’s 
leaks were expansive, ranging broadly through the realm of U.S. foreign policy. Both 
men undertook their disclosures not to harm the United States per se, but to effect change 
in U.S. policy and practices—changes they believed would restore the country to some 
better position. Perhaps the material Ellsberg leaked helped to give him a favorable 
outcome in the court system because it proved government misconduct. In an indirect 
way, the substance of his material legitimized his leak because it proved he had good 
intentions for leaking the material.  
The scope of Manning’s leaks also offers valuable insight to his character. 
Manning’s leak encompassed a wide swath of information without any particular 
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emphasis. In fact it complicated U.S. national policy more than drastically changing 
American public opinion about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. His omnivorous 
approach eroded the legitimacy of the message he claimed he was trying to communicate 
to the public. Arguably, he would have leaked continued leaking non-related 
information—more or less anything he could scoop up and save on his thumb drive—if 
he had not been found out. 
3. Leakers’ Desired End-State  
Ellsberg and Manning had specific goals in mind when they leaked classified 
information. Both individuals were passionate about achieving their goals regardless of 
the consequences.  
Ellsberg wanted to stop the Vietnam War. He believed leaking the Pentagon 
Papers “was the only way to inform Congress and the public of information that was 
being wrongfully withheld from them.” He considered and tried many options other than 
the media leak. In his mind, the information was “vital to the constitutional processes of 
decision making on an ongoing war in which tens of thousands of U.S. citizens and 
millions of Vietnamese had been—in effect—lied to death.” 100 During the Pentagon 
Papers study, Ellsberg became skeptical of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He came to the 
knowledge that all the administrations spanning the study had waged a secret war against 
North Vietnam without public approval or congressional consent. Additionally, his in-
country knowledge of Vietnam—gained while embedded with the U.S. military—and his 
involvement with taskforces caused him to rethink U.S. policy. He believed 
indiscriminate bombing resulted in unnecessary collateral damage and pushed the 
population to engender the Viet Cong. He communicated his finding through his chain of 
command and congressional channels to no avail. 
Manning was a professed humanist who believed in the sanctity of all human life. 
This conviction compelled Manning to leak documents—not to harm the United States, 
but to convey what was happening during the war. He thought leaking was the right thing 
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to do. Arguably, his intentions were influenced by his Hacktivist view, namely that 
information should be free and available to the public. Moreover, he felt that the U.S. 
public had a right to know what was being done in its name. The manner in which he 
disclosed information hints to a certain amount of malevolent intent because he leaked 
the information using an untraceable protocol (TOR) to hide his identity; however, his 
supporters argue that he needed the cloak of anonymity to gather the material for 
publication.  
4. Fallout of the Leaks   
The government responds to a leak in two ways. First, the executive branch seeks 
to secure the source of the leak. Second, the legislative branch wants to ensure the 
executive branch does not overstep its authority. The legislative branch considers public 
outcry in constructing its response.  
a. Executive Branch 
The executive branch takes its position from the security perspective because the 
information released could potentially damage U.S. national security. Intelligence sources 
and methods are compromised, endangering the lives of the men and woman in the field. 
Enemies of the United States are able to obtain intelligence against her without any effort 
on their part. In leaking cases, the executive branch sought to contain the leak.  
Ultimately, the executive branch wants to punish the leaker and return to the 
informational status quo before the leak occurred. When classified information is leaked, 
the executive branch takes a defensive posture in order to defend against the backlash the 
leak imposes, take action to address the leak and to bring the leaker to justice.  
With the Pentagon Papers, President Nixon pursued an injunction against the 
media in the Supreme Court, yet lost. Then the government initiated criminal proceedings 
against Ellsberg and co-conspirator Anthony Russo. The administration thought that 
prosecuting Ellsberg and Russo would deter others from committing intelligence leaks.101  
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In the case of WikiLeaks, the government did not fight a battle against the media 
due, in part, to the jurisprudence established by the Pentagon Papers. (The U.S. 
government had entertained the idea of shutting down the WikiLeaks website and 
prosecuting its founder, Julian Assange,102 but neither the man nor his servers came 
under clear U.S. jurisdiction.) The United States could reach the leaker, however, and 
brought Bradley Manning up for trial. 
b. Legislative Branch 
Congress takes its position from the offensive perspective because must initiate 
actions demanded by its oversight role and the citizens they represent. In the case of the 
Pentagon Papers, Congress was outraged and felt deceived. Congress realized the 
briefings members received regarding the war had been deceptive and misleading. The 
resounding sentiment in Congress was to limit executive authority to the extent that they 
proposed legislation to defund the Vietnam War. Trust between the executive and 
legislative branch had eroded. How could legislators allow the president to make foreign 
policy decisions without first consulting the Congress?103  
Congressional response was different in the WikiLeaks revelation. Their backlash 
was more toward WikiLeaks as an organization than what the leaks revealed. Unlike 
Congress during the Pentagon Papers leak, legislators during the GWOT were aware of 
many issues Manning disclosed. (Arguably, since the Vietnam era, oversight legislation 
had empowered Congress with a reach to constrain somewhat executive authority and 
demand congressional blessing before certain actions occur.) Their focus fell on the 
failure of the national security apparatus, though political figures in the anti-war camp 
appropriated aspects of the leaks that supported their position.  
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As with the Pentagon Papers, public opinion was split between those who value 
security—and therefore condemned Manning—and those who champion civil liberties, 
who praised his actions. The divide in public sentiment fits into the liberty-versus-
security discussion. Avid supporters on each side of the debate leverage leaks to justify 
their position, while those in the middle redistribute the weight on the scale.  
5. Detecting Deliberate Insider Leaks 
It is difficult to detect and stop leakers from deliberately leaking information from 
inside their perspective intelligence community agency. The Pentagon Papers and 
WikiLeaks highlight the challenges of protecting classified material from internal 
compromises. The internal checks and balances in the intelligence community are fairly 
effective in minimizing accidental leaks or spill and deterring espionage. The system is 
not designed to detect deliberate insider leaks because it is assumed that everyone with 
access to classified information is trustworthy. These individuals endured a rigorous 
vetting process—tiered to the level of authorization—in order to receive access to 
classified material. Moreover, they signed non-disclosure agreements acknowledging 
awareness of the duties and responsibilities associated with handling sensitive material 
and the penalties for violating the agreements.  
Ellsberg and Manning understood the consequences of their actions and broke the 
trust they had with the executive branch. Because the basis of deterrence against 
wrongdoing in the intelligence community involves trust, perhaps it is impossible to 
prevent individuals intent on compromising classified information from leaking it.  
D. CONCLUSION 
These cases reveal several factors worth consideration: 1) Leaking classified 
material that is external in nature embarrasses the government and possibly threatens 
national security; 2) technology use in the intelligence community is a dual-edged sword 
that enables the efficiency of both the intelligence community and the leaker; 3) it is 
virtually impossible to prevent and detect deliberate insider leaks; 4) the intelligence 
community is reluctant to incorporate change via the internal grievance system; 5) 
besides internal review, containing the leak and prosecuting the leaker is the only 
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recourse the executive branch has in combating an intelligence leak; and 6) intelligence 
leaks cause the legislative branch to re-evaluate oversight mechanisms. 
The intelligence community is reluctant to change based on feedback received 
through the internal grievance system. Leaders recognize the need for a way to channel 
and address grievances, but are hesitant to discuss matters that could constrain or change 
the methods and sources used to secure the country. To develop and establish effective 
policy is a difficult and extensive undertaking in and of itself that could lead to the 
unintended consequence of increasing the cost and undermining the overall effectiveness 
of the intelligence community.  
The executive branch is limited in the actions it can take after a leak is exposed. 
Both cases forced the government to review its intelligence programs; however, 
containing the leak and prosecuting the leaker are the main recourse the executive branch 
has in combating an intelligence leak. In both cases, the government tried to control the 
damage of the leak. During the time of the Pentagon Papers, the government had tools at 
its disposal, such as injunctions against the media. Jurisprudence created in its aftermath 
effectively removed that option to suppress the media. The only legitimate option 
remaining is to bring the leaker to justice and make an example of him or her to dissuade 
similar behavior.  
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IV. LEAKS OF AN DOMESTIC NATURE: EDWARD SNOWDEN 
AND NSA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS  
Edward Snowden divulged information about the National Security 
Administration surveillance programs, detailing bulk information collection against 
United States citizens. Although his leaks have external or international ramification, this 
case will focus on the domestic (internal) aspect of the NSA surveillance programs within 
the United States. This leak is significant because it exposed the government’s ability to 
collect large sums of metadata through routinely used information systems and 
communication methods. Additionally, it opened a discussion about the Fourth 
Amendment and the proliferation of communication technology.  
Snowden’s case is similar to Ellsberg’s and Manning’s in the following ways: 1) 
it occurred during times of national crisis; 2) it exposed the United States government’s 
external activities; and 3) it used the media as a way to spread the leaked material. The 
most significant difference between Snowden’s leak and the others is that his leak 
resonated deeply among the United States public because it confirmed that the 
government would and could conduct surveillance of her citizens.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. National Security Agency focuses on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). In 
1952 when the NSA was first founded, SIGINT was limited to radio frequency and 
telephone technologies. As technology advanced, the NSA expanded its signal 
intelligence capability to cover new transmission media and forms of communication 
including fiber optics, satellite communications, cellular phones, and the Internet.  
Typically, NSA surveillance is conducted against foreign entities internationally. 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) grants special permission authorizing 
limited domestic intelligence collection. Without court permission, the NSA is legally 
prohibited from domestic intelligence collection. James Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), has denied on several occasions—including congressional hearings—
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that the NSA conducts domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Edward Snowden’s 
revelation of two major NSA surveillance programs challenged this truth.104  
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian, a left-leaning British national daily, published a 
secret court order requiring bulk collection of metadata by Verizon. The court forced the 
telecom giant to furnish the NSA with the telephone records of millions of its U.S. 
customers. The FISC order required Verizon Business Network System to provide the 
NSA with an electronic copy of all metadata communications between the U.S. and 
abroad and/or solely within the United States.105 The next day, The Guardian published 
the second significant domestic-related leak, the Planning tool for Resource Integration, 
Synchronization, and Management (PRISM). PRISM is a collaboration program between 
the NSA and Internet firms. It offers the NSA direct system access to companies like 
Google, Facebook, and Apple. The access allows analysts to collect email content, search 
history, and file transfers.106 These back-to-back revelations intensified the blow to the 
intelligence community and forced the executive branch to justify the programs. They 
also caused Congress to question the legitimacy of the programs.  
The executive branch reacted to the Snowden’s leaks in a similar fashion as the 
Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks. Again, it was put in a defensive position as it sought to 
control the damage of the leak and find out the source in order to bring him or her to 
justice. Unlike the Ellsberg and Manning leaks, the executive branch could justify its 
actions according to the law. The executive branch believed it was justified in conducting 
the programs that Snowden disclosed because it was authorized by the USA PATRIOT 
Act and FISA. 107 The White House released a whitepaper detailing the legitimacy of the 
NSA surveillance programs, citing that Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
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Section 702 of FISA authorized the bulk collection program and the 2004 FISA opinion 
authorized the use of internet metadata under the pen register statue.108 
Congress, on the other hand, questioned the legitimacy of the bulk collection 
program. With overwhelming support, Congress authorized and renewed the USA 
PATRIOT Act, but they intended the law be used differently than the executive branch 
interpreted, especially Section 215. Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall have argued for 
some time that the USA PATROIT Act that Congress passed is different in material ways 
than the one the intelligence community is implementing. Included in the discussion is 
Congresswoman Dianne Feinstein, chair of the intelligence committee, who asked for a 
review of NSA surveillance programs.109  
Just like the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks, the congressional oversight 
mechanism was implicated by Snowden’s disclosure. The public’s concern was factored 
in the congressional response. Congress has leverage over the NSA because it has 
budgetary control; however, despite all of their probes and expression of discontent 
concerning NSA surveillance programs, the NSA budget was enlarged. Perhaps this 
comports the limited domestic outcry of the United States public indicating their 
agreement with the programs.110 
B. EDWARD SNOWDEN 
Edward Joseph Snowden was born on June 21, 1983, in Elizabeth City, North 
Carolina. He spent the majority of his adolescent life in Ellicott, Maryland, where 
glandular fever and the devastation of his parents’ divorce caused him to dropout of high 
school. He was raised in a patriotic family—his father was a retired Coast Guard officer 
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and his mother was the chief deputy clerk for administration and information technology 
for the federal court in Baltimore, Maryland.111 
At age 16, Snowden earned a General Education Diploma (GED) from Anne 
Arundel Community College. He also studied computer technology there. He interrupted 
his studies to join the U.S. Army. Unfortunately, his military career was short-lived. After 
four months of service, he broke his legs and was discharged.112  
Snowden returned to his primary interest: computer systems. This knowledge, 
combined with formal education, created the opportunity to work for the NSA. Upon 
completing his degree, Snowden was hired as a security guard for the NSA—a position 
that he translated into an information technology job at the CIA. His technical knowledge 
earned Snowden a position in Geneva, Switzerland, maintaining CIA computer network 
security. Later, he resigned his position at the CIA and took a job with Dell as a 
contractor supporting the NSA computer systems in Japan and eventually Hawaii. With 
an eye on more access to NSA files, Snowden left Dell for employment at Booz Allen 
Hamilton as a systems administrator. This position gave Snowden untraceable reach into 
the NSA’s computer network. While serving in this position, Snowden leaked classified 
documents to The Guardian.113  
So far, it is hard to identify a particular moment or incident that pushed Snowden 
to leak. In fact, when the Manning WikiLeaks incident broke, Snowden was outspoken in 
his contempt for Manning’s actions. Snowden was in Switzerland at the time. He was still 
in Geneva when the CIA recruited a Swiss banker to secure secret financial information. 
To effect the recruitment, the agency got the banker drunk and encouraged him to drive 
so the Swiss police would arrest him. In his moment of abject need, the banker was 
befriended by the undercover arresting officer, who offered help and exploited the 
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relationship for information. Snowden claims these types of incidents disillusioned him 
about the U.S. government and how it works in the wider world.114 
An unwarranted (in his view) reprimand also might have contributed to 
Snowden’s disgruntled view of the government. He says he had detected flaws in a web 
application and brought it to his boss’s attention. The supervisor was disinclined to act on 
Snowden’s claims, but ultimately, he allowed Snowden to test the system’s proneness to 
hacking. Snowden inserted some non-malicious code and text into the program. When 
more senior management found out, they entered a negative report in Snowden’s file, 
even though his foray into “white-hat” hacking happened with his immediate supervisor’s 
blessing. Snowden later claimed that his lack of faith in the chain of command and proper 
channels owed to such experiences.115 
Ultimately, Snowden says he was motivated to leak by the continuous string of 
lies by NSA officials to Congress—and, by extension, to U.S. citizens—and the 
realization that congressional oversight was dysfunctional. Moreover, he said, he could 
not “in good conscience allow the U.S. government to destroy privacy, internet freedom 
and basic liberties for people around the world with this massive surveillance machine 
they’re secretly building.”116 In his view, DNI James Clapper openly lying to Congress 
about domestic surveillance programs without repercussion suggested subverted 
democracy. Snowden believed that the congressional intelligence oversight mechanisms 
failed to keep the NSA in check.117  
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C. ANALYSIS 
The disclosure of the NSA surveillance programs occurred while the nation was at 
war; still, it was the first time there was irrefutable proof that the United States 
government was collecting data on its citizens. Snowden’s supporters characterize his 
disclosures as a heroic act of free expression; they also point to the questionable 
legitimacy and legality of mass domestic surveillance programs that have no judicial or 
meaningful legislative oversight. Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourth 
Amendment118 seem to stretch far enough to cover the mountains of data that the NSA 
programs store for indeterminate future use. Meanwhile, the government insists that the 
priority of national security obviates any of the foregoing niceties. 
1. Access to Leaked Classified Information 
Snowden leveraged his systems administrator position to leak classified 
information. As a systems administrator, Snowden had access to a plethora of 
information. Most jobs entail the use of some sort of information system, which 
information technology (IT) professionals have to access on a routine basis. From the 
user’s perspective, anyone authorized to work with information systems must be 
trustworthy. Perhaps due to their unfamiliarity with information systems, they are prone 
to trust and comply with IT department requests.  
Snowden’s system administrator-level privileges while employed at Booz Allen 
Hamilton gave him unadulterated access to computers the NSA hacked worldwide. He 
used NSAnet—a secure intranet system created after the 9/11 attacks for various 
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intelligence community agencies to liaise—to siphon information. In an interview with 
Guardian reporter Glen Greenwald, Snowden explained “that he had a rare overview of 
the NSA’s extraordinary surveillance capacities, that he could see the dark places where 
the agency was going.”119 Normal user access activity is monitor and recorded—
especially any downloads, uploads, and file transfers to or from external devices. Part of 
the security built into secure intranets is its isolation from the traditional Internet—a 
network security measure known as an “air gap.” Snowden breached this gap when he 
downloaded untold amounts of data to a storage device. 
2. Material Leaked 
Snowden revealed the extent of NSA surveillance programs. The world and the 
U.S. public received a first-hand account of the reach, scope, and depth of the NSA 
surveillance capability. The PRISM diagram published by the Guardian delivered a 
detailed block diagram of how the NSA collects data from third-party applications such 
as PayPal, Facebook, Yahoo, and Google.120 He also leaked information implying that 
the United States bugged European government facilities, including the phone of German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel.121 This revelation, coupled with the PRISM program 
disclosure, produced resounding reaction in Europe. Within the United States, the 
majority of focus was placed on the bulk collection program and PRISM.  
3. The Leaker’s Desired End-state  
Snowden intended to reveal to the U.S. public and the world that the United States 
was secretly spying on its own citizens. He believed that the NSA surveillance programs 
operated beyond proper bounds, and that the agency was violating personal privacy—and 
thereby, the U.S. Constitution. In recounting his first meeting with Snowden, the 
Guardian’s Greenwald found that Snowden was convinced of the rightness of his 
actions—intellectually, emotionally, and psychologically. Snowden did not view his 
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leaks as betrayal, but as a necessary action to right the dysfunctional spy system. 122 To 
bolster his claims of benevolent intentions, Snowden revealed that he could have caused 
great harm to the United States if he had been so motivated. “I had a full roster of 
everybody anybody working at the NSA; the entire intelligence community and 
undercover assets around the world. The locations of every station we have, all of their 
missions . . . If I just wanted to damage the U.S. I could have shut down the surveillance 
system in an afternoon. That was never my intention.”123  
On the other hand, the NSA does not know the extent of what Snowden stole or 
whether the leaks will stop. Another outstanding question is whether Snowden might be 
holding other information to use as leverage in his ongoing efforts to secure asylum 
somewhere other than Russia. Such a cynical quid pro quo, with information of 
importance to U.S. national security as part of the bargain, would seriously diminish 
Snowden’s “only trying to help” argument.  
4. Fallout of the Leaks 
Response to The Guardian publication of Snowden’s leaked document was 
dramatic. It triggered a long and at times tense debate in the United States over 
surveillance and its legality, necessity, and possibilities for reform. The general reaction, 
both domestic and international, was shock at the thought of the United States spying on 
its own citizens.  
a. Executive Branch  
The executive branch reverted to damage-control measures in order to minimize 
the destructiveness of Snowden’s leaks. Arguably, the most significant problem rested in 
the international community. Foreign nations—friends and foe—realized that they could 
suffer push-back domestically if Snowden leaked information indicating their 
involvement in wholesale data collection. Since the nodes that the NSA exploited to 
collect information are spread throughout the world, cooperation by the states where they 
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are located was necessary. There was a risk that the revelations could erode trust between 
the United States and her cooperative states over intelligence-sharing agreements.  
Two major leaks (WikiLeaks and NSA surveillance programs) within a few 
years’ time also hints that the United States may not have control over its intelligence 
community. 
In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the government has released its own 
material on the exposed government surveillance programs. Although these official 
releases have helped promote greater public understanding of government surveillance 
programs, distrust remains. Several government initiatives have also been taken to 
increase public knowledge of NSA surveillance programs. The Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) created a public website (IC on the Record), where it 
released thousands of documents relating to USA PATRIOT Act Section 215 and 702 
program—as well as material concerning FISA and the operation of the FISC. The site 
also includes a compilation of public statements by government officials, press 
statements, and congressional testimony on these matters. Additionally, the FISA court 
has created a new website where pleadings, orders, and a host of related materials are 
posted.124   
b. Legislative Branch  
Congress responded in similar fashion to the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks in 
the sense that it sought to exercise its oversight function. A group of U.S. senators 
requested, and President Obama authorized, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB) to review the NSA surveillance program. The president authorized the 
study, directing that it focus on instances where counterterrorism efforts and national 
values contend.125 High-ranking intelligence community officials were called to testify 
before Congress concerning the NSA bulk collection programs. In the end, however, 
Congress declined to de-fund the NSA.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Surveillance is a necessary function of the NSA and the intelligence community 
as a whole. Before the means of communicating became so convenient, collection was 
less tenuous. The laws governing intelligence community surveillance collection 
arguably were written to the technology of an era before cell phones and the Internet. 
Issues arise when the intelligence community leverages technology to their advantage. 
Disputes over what is allowable arise due to the gray area that outdated laws inject 
concerning new technology. The lethargic nature of laws to address new technology 
appears archaic, but is a healthy function of societies that respect the rule of law. 
Snowden’s leak forced the government and public to readdress the issues surveillance 
yields within the use of modern technology. Just about everyone uses information 
technology in some form; therefore, it is understandable why the NSA would monitor 
those systems. The uproar resulting from Snowden’s disclosure is forcing a new look at 
old statues. In this vein, the leak functioned as a catalyst that forced U.S. democracy into 
action.  
On the other hand, the penalties the government levies seem not to deter a leaker 
from leaking classified information. Snowden knew the consequences associated with 
leaking classified information and still chose to leak. Snowden was prepared to end his 
life the way he knew it and suffer the consequences of his actions. In a sense, his attitude 
is analogous to a suicide bomber who willing to sacrifice his life for what he or she 
perceives is the greater good.  
Overall, one might argue, the Snowden leak has had some positive impact on U.S. 
democracy, by invigorating the public and all three branches of government. Because the 
U.S. public was ignorant of the NSA’s surveillance programs, Snowden’s role was to 
inform. So in this vein, at least according to his defenders, Snowden’s action aligned with 
the democratic perquisite of transparency. 
Regardless of the reason, after Snowden initiated the leak, it charted its own 
course outside of the leaker’s intention. Regardless of where someone stands regarding 
Snowden’s disclosures, he did break the law—but in doing so, created the feedback that 
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the control circuit of the democratic process needed to readjust the balance between 
liberty and security. Herein resides the dilemma in determining what degree of 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although the United States is the longest-standing democracy in the modern 
world, it is still evolving. The history of challenges highlighted in the earlier chapters and 
the progress toward liberty and security proves that all democracies are works in 
progress. From the first Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 to the WPEA, U.S. democracy 
has proven strong enough to overcome its growing pains. Political, economic, and racial 
factors influencing U.S. policy all condense to one over-arching factor: fear. This fear 
drives the need for economic superiority; national survival fuels the need for secrecy.  
A. THE CASES AND THE QUESTIONS 
Several generalities are made from these cases. For one, all of the leakers believed 
in what they were doing. They perceived a wrong and desired to address the issue. They 
all chose to go outside of the established channels of authority, in no small part because 
each lost trust in the government apparatus in the same three-step manner. First, they 
came to detest the actions of the government entity that committed the offense. Second, 
they were not confident that the government would police itself adequately. And last, 
they believed oversight was ineffective. Moreover, they each experienced situations that 
reinforced their perception of non-relief through normal government channels. 
The leaks occurred, it seems, when the nation was ready to take back some of its 
civil liberties. In each of the cases, the United States was at war but the support of U.S. 
citizens for war was waning. Leaks, like all other revelations in politics, have an optimal 
window of opportunity to deliver the desired effect. Possibly, the leakers themselves 
understood the pulse of the nation, which factored into the timing of the leak.  It is worth 
noting that the United States was approximately 10 years into these conflicts when the 
leakers disclosed secret information. This nexus is significant because it indicates that 
any prolonged conflict will result in an intelligence leak.  
Technology works to the leaker’s advantage in each of the case studies here. 
Specifically, the government’s imperfect control over the way that sensitive information 
is accessed, stored, safeguarded, evaluated, and used means that the motivated leaker can 
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find a way in. Moreover, the classification of information plays its own role because 
over-classification is a verified issue within the intelligence community. . Individuals in 
and around the intelligence community agree that the classification system is bloated and 
requires reform. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former chairman of the Commission on 
Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, found that over-classification was prolific 
and concluded that “excessive secrecy has significant consequences for the national 
interest when, as a result, policymakers are not fully informed, government is not held 
accountable for its actions, and the public cannot engage in informed debate.”126 As U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously quipped in the Pentagon Papers case, 
“when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to 
be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on 
self-protection or self-promotion” 127 
There is no single, yes-no answer to the question of whether the leaker’s 
intentions matter. On one hand, the main event in any leak is that the information at issue 
is disclosed beyond its authorized audience. How the information made its way into the 
public domain is inconsequential to U.S. democracy. Neither the public nor Congress will 
ignore the leak simply because the leaker’s intentions were malicious. Congress has a 
duty to respond, and in each of the cases at hand in this thesis, Congress investigated and 
pressed the executive for accountability and transparency. On the other hand, the 
intention of the leaker resonates in public opinion. Such laws as the Whistleblower 
Protection Act indicate that Congress accepts at least the idea that good intentions matter 
in evaluating a given leak.  
Of course, the executive branch will seek harsh penalties for those who commit 
intelligence leaks. The penalties for leaking range from a bureaucratic rebuke for a 
technical violation of non-disclosure clauses in a contract to execution for treason. These 




punishments must have something to do with the fact that the number of intelligence 
leaks, when compared to the number of individuals who hold security clearances, is 
actually quite small.  
Conversely, the cases prove that no manner of deterrent will prevent an individual 
driven by passionately held convictions from leaking information. Moreover, the 
outstanding issue remains whether such punishment fits the offense and the needs of 
American democracy?  
Ultimately, the leak serves democratic self-correction. The leak is analogous to an 
electronic control circuit. As the output function starts to go out of specifications, a signal 
is injected into the circuit that brings the output back into tolerable levels. The leak is the 
feedback. Once the information is released, the resulting actions are irrevocable; the 
system starts to react. Information in the public domain demands certain responses by the 
group implicated. Material that illuminates government indiscretions forces U.S. 
democracy into action. In this sense, the leak is the input, the U.S. democratic process the 
control circuit, and the balance between liberty and security is the output. Essentially, the 
democratic process self-corrects due to the stimuli of the leak.  
The change that the leaker causes is not limited to congressional oversight, but 
extends to reform in the intelligence community. The leaker exposes the weakness in the 
intelligence community security system. By understanding the leaker’s motives and 
methods, the intelligence community as a whole can reassess current policy and make 
changes—which the leaker’s action revealed in regards to the failure of the security 
system. The leak is a catalyst for change. In the analogy of the control circuit, the leaker 
is the part of the circuit that generates the leak feedback. The leaker provides the public 
and Congress with information that aids in oversight. It also informs citizens of what is 
occurring in their name.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on these findings, this thesis makes the following recommendations: 
1. Expand internal grievance reporting capacity with requisite training.  
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In all three cases, either the internal grievance apparatus did not work or 
there was perceived dysfunction in the system. Building trust and 
confidence within the system will provide an increased incentive to stay 
within its boundaries fostering a culture of confidence in the viability of 
the grievance system.  
2. Review classification system. 
Multiple committee studies have proven that the classification system is 
inefficient. A review the system in the context of U.S. citizen’s right to 
know would reduce the burden of unauthorized disclosure for all levels of 
government.  
3. Reassess conflicts to determine those with the possibility of becoming 
protracted and preemptively channel complaints. 
These cases show a connection between the leak, protracted conflicts, and 
waning public support. It behooves the executive branch to constantly 
reassess the cost-benefit calculus of U.S. policy objectives. The cases 
indicate that the likelihood of leak increases the longer a conflict occurs.  
4. Review punishment for unauthorized disclosure of classified information.  
Link the repercussions for unauthorized disclosure to an incentive 
program for using prescribed grievance procedures. The intelligence 
community should establish a classified system similar to the WPA and 
merit board system to determine at what level, if any, to protect the leaker. 
Of note, the punishment and security clearance vetting system seems to 
work in deterring acts of espionage. Therefore, it should remain 
unchanged.  
5. Embrace the changes the leak and the leaker precipitate. 
The thesis revealed that the leak and the leaker help to bring about reform 
within the systems of all parties involved in the leak. The leaks analyzed 
in the research embarrassed the United States., yet they also bolstered it 




It also shows the world (and the folks at home) that the United States is 
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